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to the appropriate remedy and
associated costs, the record was
sufficient to justify the trial court's
judgment on the issue of damages.
Thus, the Wyoming Supreme
Court affirmed the damage
awards.
The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent argued that the ma-
jority held the Builder liable even
in the absence of negligence. This
strict liability theory, based on the
Wyoming Uniform Commercial
Code, was incorrect because the
code does not apply to real proper-
ty. The dissent also argued that
under the strict liability theory, all
builders would be forced to insure
the construction of the houses they
built. Such a standard would re-
quire builders to attend to and
repair even the slightest defects
and would result in increased costs
to consumers. Finally, the dissent
argued, the majority's approach
was unnecessary because the reme-
dies developed in the Wyoming
Supreme Court's prior cases were
sufficient to protect homeowners.
Richard B. Vaughn
New Jersey Supreme
Court Finds Tooth
Discoloration Strict
Liability Claim Not
Preempted By FDA
Regulation
In Feldman v. Lederle Lab-
oratories, 592 A. 2d 1176 (N.J.
1990), the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that federal law did not
require prior approval from the
Food and Drug Administration
("FDA") before a drug manufac-
turer could warn of a known or
knowable danger in its products.
Consequently, the court found that
federal law did not preempt a strict
liability claim brought under New
Jersey state tort law against a drug
manufacturer for failure to warn
that one of its products could cause
tooth discoloration.
Background
This case involved tetracyclines,
a group of antibiotics first pro-
duced in 1948, which are primarily
used to treat bacterial infections.
In 1959, Lederle Laboratories
("Lederle") introduced a new form
of tetracycline, demethylchlorte-
tracycline, marketed under the
trade name Declomycin.
Dr. Harold Feldman had treated
his daughter, Carol Ann Feldman
("Feldman"), with Declomycin
two or three times a year between
1960 and 1963. Feldman's baby
teeth were discolored gray-brown.
When her permanent teeth
emerged in 1965, they too were
discolored. Prior to 1963, Declo-
mycin contained no warning of
tooth discoloration as a potential
side effect.
Lederle had a long history of
correspondence with the FDA re-
garding the potential side effects of
various tetracyclines. In Novem-
ber, 1962, Dr. Swanzey, an em-
ployee of Lederle, wrote a letter to
the FDA notifying the administra-
tion of the possible correlation
between tooth discoloration and
tetracycline use. In this letter, Dr.
Swanzey proposed adding a warn-
ing of the potential side effects to
the labels of all Lederle tetracycline
products.
The FDA responded that it had
not yet reached any conclusions,
but would contact Dr. Swanzey
once it made a final determination.
In January, 1963, Dr. Swanzey
wrote the FDA with additional
information regarding the side ef-
fects of tetracycline use, one of
which was tooth discoloration. In
February, 1963, the FDA informed
Lederle of its conclusion that tetra-
cycline use had an effect on the
bones and teeth. Furthermore, the
FDA proposed that a warning be
placed on Tetracycline, Chlortetra-
cycline, and Oxytetracycline. At
this time, the FDA had no specific
clinical evidence that Declomycin
caused tooth discoloration, but
confirmed that it would remain
alert for the possibility of such
correlation.
Through Dr. Swanzey, Lederle
continued to correspond with the
FDA regarding the possibility that
Declomycin caused tooth staining.
In July, 1963, the FDA stated that
it required factual evidence of ad-
verse reactions to substantiate any
official regulatory change in warn-
ings. Because Lederle could only
speculate as to the connection be-
tween Declomycin and tooth dis-
coloration, the FDA had chosen
not to change its official stance
regarding the warning.
Finally, on November 11, 1963,
after negotiations with the FDA, a
Lederle official wrote the Adminis-
tration that the company would
include a warning statement on its
Declomycin label. The FDA ac-
cepted the proposed warning,
which was incorporated into the
packaging of Declomycin in De-
cember, 1963.
Subsequently, in 1978, Feld-
man, through her father as guard-
ian ad litem, sued Lederle in New
Jersey state court to recover dam-
ages for her tooth discoloration
under theories of negligence, gross
negligence, breach of express and
implied warranties, and strict
products liability.
Lower Court Proceedings
The trial court entered judgment
on a jury verdict in favor of Led-
erle, and Feldman appealed. The
Superior Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, affirmed. The New Jersey
Supreme Court granted Feldman's
petition for certification and re-
manded the case back to the appel-
late division for reconsideration.
The appellate division affirmed its
original position. This time the
supreme court reversed and re-
manded for a new trial. At the
second trial, the jury returned a
verdict for Feldman on the sole
count of strict liability for failure to
warn under state tort law. The
appellate division reversed and re-
manded for entry of judgment in
favor of Lederle. From this ruling,
the New Jersey Supreme Court
again granted Feldman's certifica-
tion petition.
Supreme Court Opinion
The New Jersey Supreme Court
first addressed Lederle's argument
that Feldman's cause of action
based on state law failure to warn
was preempted because of an actu-
al conflict with federal laws and
regulations. The court made clear
that Lederle first had to overcome
a presumption against preemption,
since state power is not to be
superseded by federal acts unless it
(continued on page 34)
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(continued from page 33)
is the clear purpose of Congress.
Lederle argued that the FDA
regulations in effect before the
1965 amendments did not permit
the company to add warning labels
regarding tooth staining without
FDA approval. Lederle did not
obtain the approval until 1963.
Lederle also claimed that warning
without approval would have vio-
lated federal regulation 21 C.F.R.
146.4, which prohibits the relabel-
.ling of drugs without FDA permis-
sion. Thus, Lederle asserted that it
would have violated federal regula-
tions by complying with the New
Jersey law requiring a warning to
be communicated as soon as rea-
sonably feasible once a company
gained actual or constructive
knowledge of a danger.
Feldman argued that Lederle
knew or, through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have
known of the potentially serious
and permanent side effects of De-
clomycin at the time she ingested
the drug. Feldman also asserted
that, in light of this knowledge,
Lederle failed to warn antibiotic
consumers of these dangers in a
timely and reasonable fashion and
thereby violated state tort law.
The supreme court found no
direct conflict between federal and
state law. The court expressed con-
cern that, since nothing in the
federal regulations explicitly pre-
empted claims brought under state
law, a finding of preemption would
leave Feldman without a remedy.
Thus, the court asserted that using
the FDA regulation governing la-
bel changes as Lederle proposed
infringed on the state's powers to
protect and promote the safety of
its citizens.
The New Jersey Supreme Court
then considered whether the FDA
regulations actually precluded
Lederle from warning of Declomy-
cin's dangerous side effects. Led-
erle argued that by warning with-
out permission, it would have been
subject to either punishment for
misbranding or removal of its
product from the market. The
court disagreed, stating that the
FDA had determined that warning
of dangerous side effects at the
earliest possible time was consis-
tent with its goal of protecting
public health. The court offered
some alternatives Lederle could
have considered, including not dis-
tributing the drug, trying harder to
get approval, or waiting until more
tests were done to ascertain if the
drug caused tooth discoloration.
Finally, Lederle contended that
if the case were retried, Feldman
would not prevail. It relied on the
newly created New Jersey Products
Liability Statute, N.J.S.A.
2A:58C-4, which states that where
a warning or instruction has been
approved by the FDA, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the
label is adequate. However, the
court disagreed, asserting that label
adequacy standards were different
in the 1960s and that a strong
likelihood of rebutting the pre-
sumption existed in this case.
Dissenting Opinion
Dissenting Judge Garibaldi crit-
icized the majority's narrow view
of the FDA's role in society. The
FDA's mission is to make a risk-
utility analysis of drugs in order to
determine if the benefit to society
outweighs the potential dangers.
The Judge asserted that the FDA
has a greater accumulation of in-
formation and expertise on drugs
than any other source, including
Lederle. Thus, the majority opin-
ion upset this risk-balancing analy-
sis by imposing the court's judg-
ment in hindsight upon drug
manufacturers.
Judge Garibaldi recognized that
promoting uniformity is another
goal of the FDA. Thus, the majori-
ty's contention that pre- 1965, drug
manufacturers could change a
product warning without FDA ap-
proval was erroneous. Otherwise,
with each manufacturer changing
labels upon its own prerogative,
labels would become useless and
unbelievable.
Gregory R. Bockin
Underinsured Motorists
Provisions Do Not Cover
Accident Victims Whose
Household Membership
Is Not Readily Apparent
In Vaiarella v. Hanover
Insurance Company, 567 N.E.2d
916 (Mass. 1991), the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that a mother involved in an
automobile accident was not enti-
tled to a settlement under the
underinsured motorist provision
of her son's automobile insurance
policy because she was not a mem-
ber of his household at the time of
the accident.
Background
Salvatore and Italia Vaiarella
("Mr. and Mrs. Vaiarella", respec-
tively) lived in both East Boston
and Winthrop, Massachusetts be-
tween 1941 and 1984. Their son
Joseph ("Son") lived in Brockton,
Massachusetts, and their daughter
in East Boston. In August, 1984,
the Vaiarellas had their mail trans-
ferred to their daughter's address
but began living with their Son,
bringing with them some personal
items and furniture. Thereafter,
the Son began remodeling his ga-
rage into living quarters for his
parents.
In November, 1984, the Vaiarel-
las moved to Winter Haven, Flori-
da. They planned to live there from
January to May each year and to
live in Brockton, Massachusetts
with their Son from May to De-
cember. Upon moving to Florida,
the Vaiarellas bought a mobile
home. This purchase required Mr.
Vaiarella to have a Florida driver's
license and a Florida registration
for the car he had bought in Brock-
ton.
During the 1984 Christmas holi-
days, the Vaiarellas visited their
Son and returned to Florida imme-
diately thereafter. At that time,
their living quarters in their Son's
garage had not yet been finished.
On May 3, 1985, after their winter
stay in Florida, the Vaiarellas start-
ed out for Brockton by car. En
route, the two were in a car acci-
dent that killed Mr. Vaiarella and
injured Mrs. Vaiarella.
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